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Abstract
We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by
inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first
step we axiomatically describe players’ beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion
to be the simplest functional form that satisfies all the axioms. Then we hypothesize
players act as if they were best responding to the belief their opponent plays according
to minimax regret. When compared with existing experimental evidences about one
shot matching pennies games, the procedure correctly indicates the choices of around
80% of the players. Applications to other classes of games are also explored.
Keywords : predictions, minimax regret, beliefs, matching pennies, experiments.
JEL classification : C72, C91.
1 Introduction
Consider the situation faced by individuals who are involved in a one shot 2x2 game, possibly
as subjects of a controlled experiment. The players do not have any knowledge of game
theory and they never played before the specific game they are facing. In addition, given
that the interaction is not repeated, they cannot expect to learn and improve on their
performance over time.
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How should these players decide which strategy to play? Irrespective of the specific game
under consideration, the rational approach for dealing with such a decision under uncertainty
(in a spirit similar to Savage, 1954) is the following:
1 - each player forms a belief about what his opponent will play.
2 - each player chooses the strategy which best responds to this belief.
Interpreting it as a heuristics, this procedure cannot be expected to describe the behavior
of all the agents. Single individuals may in fact use diﬀerent decisional processes or they may
incur in computational errors in choosing their best response. Still, in spite of this noise, the
fact that in simple strategic situations the majority of individuals behave in a manner which
is coherent with their beliefs finds confirmation in some recent papers1. Nyarko and Schotter
(2002) study a 60 times repeated 2x2 game and find that around 75% of the players do indeed
best respond to their stated beliefs. For the case of 3x3 games, Rey Biel (2004) considers 10
one shot games and finds a similar rate of compliance while 55% is the percentage found by
Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2005) using data about 14 (more complex) one shot games.
Given these results, it is therefore a conservative guess to expect that, in one shot 2x2 games,
at least half of the individuals play consistently with their beliefs. We want to capture the
behavior of this majority of players.
The first part of this paper is focused on the process of beliefs formation. The goal is
to find a single function (with the payoﬀs of the game as its argument) that may describe
players’ beliefs. In looking for this function we adopt an axiomatic approach: first, we list
desirable properties that, according to us, should characterize a belief function. Then, we
check existing concepts and criteria commonly used in game theory and decision theory to
see which of them, if any, fulfills all the requirements.
We find the minimax regret criterion (originally proposed by Savage, 1951) to be the
unique candidate that obeys all the axioms. Therefore we propose minimax regret as a
proxy for players’ beliefs2 and we claim that the majority of players play "as if" they were
best responding to these approximated beliefs.
This conjecture is tested in the second part of the paper. The predictions stemming from
the suggested procedure (best respond to beliefs equal to the minimax regret distribution
of the opponent) are compared with experimental evidences about diﬀerent versions of 2x2
one shot matching pennies games. To forecast players’ choices in this class of games is
particularly problematic, also because the indication given by the Nash equilibrium is often
1These papers elicit players’ beliefs using a proper quadratic scoring rule, such that for the players "telling
the truth" is optimal.
2This proxy is "operationally" accurate in the sense that the conjectured minimax beliefs and the real
subjective beliefs appear to lead, in the majority of cases, to the same best response.
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misleading (see for instance Ochs, 1995 and Goeree and Holt, 2001). Our procedure proves
to be an eﬀective way to identify the strategies which are more likely to be played. In fact
it correctly predicts the actual choices of around 80% of the players.
In a later section the same procedure is also applied to other kinds of 2x2 games and
its relationship with the Nash prediction is explored. An interesting result is that the
procedure selects a single outcome even in games that have multiple Nash equilibria and
so it contributes to the debate on equilibrium selection (see Straub, 1995 and Haruvy and
Stahl, 2004).
This paper thus aims to get some insights into the way people actually behave in simple
strategic interactions and it is motivated by experimental results that traditional theory fails
to explain. Therefore, despite the initial theoretic axiomatic approach, the paper places itself
in the behavioral game theory literature. Behavioral game theory enriches pure game theory
by adding elements which are typical of the human nature: limited rationality, heuristic
decisions, psychological regularities, feelings and emotions. In the last few years it proved
to be successful in narrowing the gap between theory and experimental data3. Camerer
(2003) provides a very rich overview of the aims, the methods, the empirical evidence and
the findings of this fast growing area of research.
A number of studies that focus on how people play one shot simultaneous games and
investigate the issue of beliefs formation are more related to this paper. Stahl and Wilson
(1995) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2000) test the existence and relative importance of various
archetypes of players that diﬀer in the prior they have about the degree of sophistication of
their opponents. Results indicate that the majority of the individuals behave as if they were
performing one or two steps of strategic thinking. A similar result is also found by Camerer
et al. (2004) with experiments about market entry games, Nash demand games and stag
hunt games.
There are also various papers that are more specifically focused on the experimental
study of matching pennies games. Games of this family have in fact been extensively used
to test the validity of the Nash prediction and to study the issues of individuals’ learning and
adaptive dynamics. These questions stimulated much research with important contributions
by Mookherjee and Sopher (1994), Ochs (1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Erev and
Roth (1998), McKelvey et al. (2000), Tang (2001) and Goeree et al. (2003). The natural
design of these experiments consisted in letting subjects repeatedly play the same version
of a matching pennies game. A diﬀerent question is to study how agents behave in front of
a single interaction: in fact in this case players cannot learn over time and their behavior
3For instance, and as already briefly mentioned, the concept of Nash equilibrium is sometimes too "rad-
ical" and it may lead to conclusions which are often rejected by experimental evidences.
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is not aﬀected by inter temporal considerations. Less work has been carried out to study
individuals’ play in one shot games4 with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies,
the reason possibly being the fact that agents’ behavior is too erratic to reach some general
conclusions. Our paper is focused on one shot games mainly for three reasons: first, we
claim our theory is able to capture the behavior of inexperienced players; second, as just
mentioned, one shot individuals’ play has been less investigated; third, we think that enough
real life situations are more likely to be similar to one oﬀ events rather than to repeated
interactions.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lists the axioms we feel characterize a
beliefs function. Section 3 shows that minimax regret satisfies all the axioms being at the
same time very simple in its functional form. In Section 4 other candidate functions are
shown to under perform the minimax regret; in particular it is shown that various proposals
connected with the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium cannot be expected to
adequately mimic players’ beliefs. Section 5 formalizes the procedure that we claim is able
to capture the behavior of the majority of individuals. Section 6 uses existing experimental
evidences about matching pennies games to test the validity of our predictions. In Section
7 the procedure is applied, as a robustness check, to other classes of 2x2 games. Section 8
concludes.
2 An axiomatic approach to belief formation
The aim of this section is to provide an axiomatic description of players’ beliefs. These
beliefs will be later used as the starting point for a procedure that selects the strategies
most likely to be played in one shot 2x2 games. We tackle the issue of beliefs formation in a
very simplified framework. Still the axioms and the results that follow can be easily restated
for the more general case.
Consider the following 2x2 game, where player i = {A,B} can choose between strategies
Hi and Ti. We assume that x ≥ 0 and y > 0.
1)
HB TB
gH(x, y)→ HA x, · 0, ·
gT (x, y)→ TA 0, · y, ·
We focus on the beliefs of player B about what player A will play. This is the reason why
4A notable exception is Goeree and Holt (2004) that presents a model of iterated noisy introspection for
one shot interactions which is then tested over a large number of games.
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the payoﬀ matrix is incomplete and only the payoﬀs of player A appear5. Whilst keeping in
mind the example of an inexperienced boundedly rational player, B’s beliefs are considered
as being just a function of player A’s payoﬀs. To further simplify the analysis and the
exposition we assume two of the payoﬀs of player A (the ones for the outcomes in which
players make diﬀerent choices) to be equal and normalized to 0.
We indicate with:
• gH(x, y) the belief of player B about player A playing strategy HA.
• gT (x, y) the belief of player B about player A playing strategy TA.
According to us, a belief function must obey the following axioms:
[A1] Consistency with probability distribution: gH(x, y) ≥ 0, gT (x, y) ≥ 0 and
gH(x, y) + gT (x, y) = 1, ∀x, ∀y.
Axiom 1 states the most basic properties a belief function must obey, namely that it
has to identify a meaningful and complete probability distribution. Note that, because of
the relationship gH(x, y) + gT (x, y) = 1, a single probability is enough to define the entire
distribution. Therefore A1 allows us to focus just on gH(x, y). In addition the specific
functional form of gH implies that player B realizes A does respond to changes in his own
payoﬀs. The own payoﬀ eﬀect is a robust feature of games played in experiments (for clear
evidences of this eﬀect in matching pennies games see, among others, Ochs, 1995 and Goeree
and Holt, 2001).
[A2] Symmetry: gH(x, x) = 12 , ∀x.
[A3] Dominance: gH(0, y) = 0, gH(x, 0) = 1, ∀x, y > 0.
Axioms 2 and 3 restrict the behavior of the beliefs function for some peculiar values of
the payoﬀs x and y. Axiom 2, which is partly derived from A1, states that the function has
to assign a uniform prior to player B whenever A’s strategies look the same. Even if A may
still have idiosyncratic preferences over his two pure strategies, these cannot be anticipated
by B. Axiom 3 implies that players are able to recognize a weakly dominated strategy and
that they assign a null probability to the event of the opponent playing such a strategy.
The same holds a fortiori for strictly dominated strategies. A3 is thus in line with basic
5Depending on B’s payoﬀs, the partial structure of Game 1 is compatible with games such as pure
coordination, battle of the sexes and matching pennies, with the last class being our main interest.
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rationality assumptions. In 2x2 one shot games the majority of players seems to be able to
recognize and eliminate dominated strategies (Roth, 1995).
[A4] Continuity: gH(x, y) is a continuous function of both x and y.
[A5] Monotonicity: gH(x1, y) > gH(x2, y) if x1 > x2 , gH(x, y1) < gH(x, y2) if y1 > y2.
[A6] Homogeneity of degree zero: gH(kx, ky) = gH(x, y), ∀k > 0.
These three axioms list some more general properties that must characterize the function
gH . Continuity (A4) is required since there are no evident reasons for B’s beliefs to jump
in a discrete way given small changes in the arguments of the function. The monotonicity
axiom (A5) defines the sign of the already mentioned own payoﬀ eﬀect. It states that players
believe their opponent are attracted by strategies that "look better". This implies that if the
payoﬀs associated with strategy HA increase so does the probability that player B assigns
to the event of A playing that strategy. The axiom therefore requires gH(x, y) to be strictly
increasing (respectively decreasing) in x (resp. y). This requirement is in line with a large
experimental evidences (among others Ochs, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Goeree et al.,
2003). Players’ beliefs have thus to respond to any change in the payoﬀ structure with the
exception of the case in which all payoﬀs are multiplied by a positive constant k. In fact
such a transformation would not modify the relative attractiveness of the strategies. The
homogeneity of degree zero axiom (A6) formalizes this requirement.
Two more axioms conclude the normative description of the belief function.
[A7] Insensitivity to column switch: gH(x, y) remains unchanged if the payoﬀs of
the two columns are inverted.
[A8] Sensitivity to row switch: gH(x, y) = gT (x, y) if the payoﬀs of the two rows are
inverted.
These last two axioms are a bit more unusual but they still refer to very basic properties
of a beliefs function. Axiom 7 states that the beliefs of player B have to remain the same
if the payoﬀs of the columns of the game are inverted. In fact this would not aﬀect the
relative preferences of player A over his two pure strategies. To clarify this point with an
example, the axiom implies gH(x, y) = g0H(x, y) where gH(x, y) refers to the original Game
1 and g0H(x, y) refers to Game 1
0 below. For similar reasons Axiom 8 implies that B’s beliefs
distribution has to be the mirror image of the original one if the payoﬀs of the two rows in
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Game 1 are inverted: gH(x, y) = 1− g00H(x, y) = g00T (x, y) where g00T (x, y) refers to Game 100.
In other words players’ beliefs consistently react to the payoﬀ structure of the game.
10)
HB TB
g0H(x, y)→ HA 0, · x, ·
TA y, · 0, ·
100)
HB TB
HA 0, · y, ·
g00T (x, y)→ TA x, · 0, ·
2.1 Some useful properties of the beliefs function
If a function satisfies axioms A1-A8 then it also fulfills some other more specific require-
ments. An important relation is easily obtained. Start from the equality stated in Axiom 1:
gH(x, y) + gT (x, y) = 1. Because of homogeneity of degree zero (A6) every argument of gH
and of gT can be divided by y > 0. Call z = xy with z ≥ 0 to get gH(z, 1) + gT (z, 1) = 1.
Invoking again Axiom 6 divide the arguments of gT by z: gH(z, 1)+gT (1, 1z ) = 1. By axioms
7 and 8 the term gT (1, 1z ) is equivalent to gH(
1
z , 1) so that gH(z, 1) + gH(
1
z , 1) = 1 must
hold. Rename gH(·, 1) with f(·) and rearrange to get Relation 1:
f(z) = 1− f
µ
1
z
¶
(1)
Relation 1 implies that player B assigns the same probability to the event of player A
playing strategy HA in Game 2 and to the event of A playing strategy TA in Game 3 shown
below.
2)
HB TB
f(z)→ HA z, · 0, ·
TA 0, · 1, ·
3)
HB TB
HA 1z , · 0, ·
1− f( 1z )→ TA 0, · 1, ·
Note that in Game 2 and 3 only the variable z appears. Moreover, because of Relation
1, to know f(z) means to know f
¡
1
z
¢
. Given the one to one relation between ∀z ∈ [0, 1] and
the reciprocal 1z ∈ [1,∞), the analysis of a function that obeys Relation 1 can be restricted
to the partial domain z ∈ [0, 1].
It is therefore much more practical to study the beliefs function f that refers to Game
2 rather than the original function gH in Game 1. Lemma 1 states the conditions under
which the two functions are equivalent. In particular it provides suﬃcient conditions for a
generic function gH to be transformed in a simpler function f as well as conditions a generic
function f has to satisfy for being used to approximate players’ beliefs originally captured
by gH .
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Lemma 1 Consider gH and let gH(z, 1) = f(z). Then:
a) ∀gH s.t. gH satisfies axioms A1-A8 =⇒ ∃f s.t. f (z) = 1−f
¡
1
z
¢
, f(0) = 0, f (1) = 12
and f is strictly increasing on [0, 1].
b) ∀f : [0,∞]→ [0, 1) s.t. f(z) = 1− f
¡
1
z
¢
, f(0) = 0, f (1) = 12 , f is strictly increasing
on [0, 1] and f is homogeneous of degree 0 =⇒ ∃gH s.t. gH satisfies axioms A1-A8.
Proof.
a) The proof replicates the steps used to derive Relation 1. Transformations applied to
gH in order to get f are innocuous, therefore the axioms are still valid and they just need to
be restated. f(0) = 0 indicates f obeys dominance, f (1) = 12 refers to symmetry and the
requirement of f being strictly increasing on [0, 1] is equivalent to the monotonicity axiom
about gH .
b) Given that by definition f(z) = gH(z, 1), then if f is homogeneous of degree 0 the
following relation is also true: f(z) = gH(kz, k),∀k > 0. Therefore the original belief
function gH can be reconstructed starting from the relation f(z) = 1− f
¡
1
z
¢
and following
backwards the proof used to get Relation 1.
From now on we restrict our attention to generic functions f that obey the requirements
of Lemma 1 and the main object of study will be f(z): the beliefs of player B about player
A playing strategy HA in the reduced Game 2.
Some other properties of f(z) are implied by the axioms and by Relation 1. In particular
the function f is continuous both at z = 1 (limz→1− f(z) = limz→1− f
¡
1
z
¢
= 12 by Lemma
1) and at z = 0 (limz→0 f(z) = 0 and f(0) = 0 by Lemma 1) and limz→0 f( 1z ) = 1
(limz→0 f(z) = 0 and A1). Moreover, as mentioned before, there is a one to one relationship
between any z and the correspondent 1z and so between f(z) and f
¡
1
z
¢
.
f(z) : [0, 1]→
·
0,
1
2
¸
⇔ f
µ
1
z
¶
: [1,∞)→
·
1
2
, 1
¶
(2)
The following propositions are particularly important in the task of describing as pre-
cisely as possible the beliefs function because they investigate the possible curvature of f .
Proposition 2 does not require f to be diﬀerentiable, but if diﬀerentiability is assumed then
sharper results can be proven (Proposition 3).
Proposition 2 On the entire domain, f(z) is neither linear nor strictly convex.
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Proof. For any z ∈ (0, 1) take the linear combination between z and 1z such that αˆz+(1−
αˆ) 1z = 1 so that αˆ =
1
z+1 . Then, by Axiom 2, we know that f(αˆz + (1 − αˆ)
1
z ) = f(1) =
1
2 . Compare it with αˆf(z) + (1 − αˆ)f
¡
1
z
¢
which, using Relation 1, can be expressed as
1
z+1f(z)+
z
z+1 [1− f (z)] and thus as f(z)
³
1−z
1+z
´
+ zz+1 . We show that the relation defining
concavity holds: f(αˆz + (1 − αˆ) 1zf(z) > αˆf(z) + (1 − αˆ) which in this specific case means
1
2 > f (z)
³
1−z
1+z
´
+ zz+1 . This last condition simplifies to f(z) <
1
2 which is satisfied given
that z ∈ (0, 1) and the monotonicity axiom. The function f(z) is concave at least over part
of its domain and thus it cannot be linear or strictly convex.
Proposition 3 If f(z) is diﬀerentiable then it is strictly concave at z = 1.
Proof. Diﬀerentiate twice with respect to z the relation f(z) = 1 − f
¡
1
z
¢
to get the first
(3) and second (4) derivatives.
f 0(z) =
1
z2
f 0
µ
1
z
¶
(3)
f 00(z) = − 2
z3
f 0
µ
1
z
¶
− 1
z4
f 00
µ
1
z
¶
(4)
Evaluating (4) at z = 1 we get f 00(1) = −f 0(1). Given that, because of monotonicity,
f 0(1) > 0 it follows that f 00(1) < 0 and the function is strictly concave at z = 1.
2.2 Bounds on the function f(z)
The axioms and the derived properties imply a rather specific behavior of the beliefs function.
A graphical description of the bounds that restrict f appears in Figure 1. In what follows
we let z ∈ [0, 1] and therefore 1z ∈ [1,∞).
Axioms 2 and 3, when restated according to Lemma 1, provide the starting point: given
that f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 12 the function has to pass through points a = (0, 0) and b =¡
1, 12
¢
. However, this is not enough to identify the function given that f(z) is not linear
(Proposition 2). Still the fact that f(1) = 12 together with the monotonicity axiom implies
that f(z) ∈
£
0, 12
¤
and f
¡
1
z
¢
∈
£
1
2 , 1
¢
.
For what concerns the curvature of the function we know that, assuming the function to
be diﬀerentiable (as we do), f(z) has to be strictly concave at z = 1 (Proposition 3). Note
that z = 1, given its mirroring properties captured by Relation 1, is the only "peculiar"
point of the domain, i.e. the point in which a change in the sign of the second derivative
may have been expected (think for instance of a logistic function). Moreover f has also to
be concave at least in some part of the domain for 1z → ∞ because it is strictly increasing
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but bounded above by 1. Because of these two facts and in order to find a function which
is as simple as possible, we require f to be strictly concave over all the domain. In fact a
function that changes concavity would have a more complex analytical form with respect to
a "well behaved" strictly concave function6.
The concavity requirement provides a lower bound for the function in the interval [0, 1].
In fact ∀z ∈ [0, 1] , f(z) ≥ 12z has to hold where
1
2z is the equation of the line that connects
points a = (0, 0) and b =
¡
1, 12
¢
. Since f(z) = 1 − f( 1z ) has to be always valid, this lower
bound becomes an upper bound in the interval [1,∞) where f( 1z ) ≤ 1−
1
2z has to hold.
Finally note that ∀ 1z ∈ [1,∞), and given that f(
1
z ) < 1, the condition f(
1
z ) <
1
z holds
and the same condition holds ∀z ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¤
as well. We require this condition to be valid also
∀z ∈
¡
0, 12
¤
and thus f(z) < z, for any z 6= 0. This last assumption implies two things: (1)
f(z) increases less than proportionally with respect to z and (2) f(z) approaches the upper
limit 1 not too slow. In fact, given that f(z) ≤ z, the lower bound f( 1z ) ≥ 1 − z in the
interval 1z ∈ [1,∞) is directly derived from Relation 1.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the results of this section. The four thin
lines define the two corridors in which the function f has to develop with the additional con-
straints that f has to pass through points (0, 0) and
¡
1, 12
¢
and be strictly increasing. These
restrictions do not identify a unique function. Indeed any function that stays within the
bounds could be used to approximate players’ beliefs as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 ∀f s.t. f(z) = 1− f( 1z ), f is strictly increasing on [0, 1] and
1
2z ≤ f(z) ≤
min
©
z, 12
ª
,∀z ∈ [0, 1] =⇒ ∃gH s.t. f = gH .
Proof. If f satisfies Relation 1, it is strictly increasing on [0, 1] and it stays within the
bounds then it means that f satisfies Lemma 1 and thus there exists a gH s.t. f = gH .
Among all these possible functions we now turn our attention to the one which appears
in bold in Figure 1: this function is the minimax regret.
6Given that the beliefs retrieved through f will be used to predict the outcome of 2x2 games, a simple
functional form is a valuable quality. Indeed our aim is to identify the simplest function among those that
satisfy all the axioms and the derived properties.
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Figure 1: lower and upper bounds for f(z) vs. the minimax regret proposal.
3 The proposed beliefs function: the minimax regret
According to the conjecture of the paper the beliefs of player i about what player i0 will
play can be approximated by the minimax regret of player i0. Minimax regret, originally
proposed by Savage (1951), is a concept which found its main applications as a selection
criterion in decision theory (starting with Milnor, 1954). More recently minimax regret has
also been used in modeling the behavior of subjects with limited rationality (for instance
Bergermann and Schlag, 2005, for the case of boundedly rational monopolists) as well as
a way to deal with missing data in econometrics (Mansky, 2005) and it also appears in
the artificial intelligence literature (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2000). The minimax regret
criterion prescribes a player who has to make a decision under uncertainty to choose the
action that minimizes his expected regret. The regret is defined as the diﬀerence between
the best payoﬀ player A could have got if he knew what his opponent (a player or Nature)
had played and the payoﬀ the player actually got. In fact the first step to compute the
minimax regret consists in building the regret matrix which captures these diﬀerences. In
the specific case of Game 2, which remains the game under study, and given that z > 0, the
regret matrix is given by R2:
11
2)
HB TB
f(z)→ HA z, · 0, ·
TA 0, · 1, ·
R2) HA 0, · 1, · (pmmr)
TA z, · 0, · (1− pmmr)
Strategy HA attains minimax regret in pure strategies for any z > 1 while strategy TA
attains minimax regret for z ∈ [0, 1). Taking this specification as a belief function would
clearly be unsatisfactory since the pure version of the minimax regret fails both the continuity
and the monotonicity axioms. The use of mixed strategies solves this problem. Before
moving to the computation of the mixed minimax regret (mmr) note that, by construction,
in any 2x2 game, the regret matrix contains at least two zeros, a feature that makes the
computation of the mmr very easy.
To find the mmr means to find the probability distribution (defined by p˜mmr) that
equalizes the expected regret of the two strategies so that playerA is indiﬀerent in playingHA
or TA. This optimal p˜mmr solves pmmr (1) = (1− pmmr) z so that p˜mmr = zz+1 . According
to the conjecture of this paper f(z) = p˜mmr should (heuristically) hold and thus:
f(z)mmr =
z
z + 1
Once again, referring to Game 2 above, this means that player B approximately believes
player A to play strategy HA with probability zz+1 and strategy TA with the complementary
probability of 1z+1 . This candidate function obeys all the axioms and the derived properties
and assumptions as shown by the following proposition (the subscript mmr is dropped
wherever it is superfluous).
Proposition 5 the mixed minimax regret function f(z)mmr:
i) satisfies axioms A1-A8.
ii) satisfies Relation 1.
iii) is diﬀerentiable and strictly concave.
Proof. i) Trivial for the first few axioms. In particular: f(z) ∈ [0, 1] (A1), f(1) = 12
(A2), f(0) = 0 (A3), f is continuous (A4) as well as strictly increasing (A5) in z and it is
homogeneous of degree zero in its payoﬀs (A6). Concerning the last two axioms note that,
with respect to Game 2, f is indeed insensitive to column switch (A7) as shown by Game
20 and sensitive to row switch (A8, Game 200).
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20)
HB TB
HA 0, · z, ·
TA 1, · 0, ·
f(z) = zz+1 2
00)
HB TB
HA 0, · 1, ·
TA z, · 0, ·
f(z) = 1z+1
ii) Compute f
¡
1
z
¢
=
1
z
1
z+1
= 1z+1 and verify that f(z) + f
¡
1
z
¢
= zz+1 +
1
z+1 = 1.
iii) The second derivative is given by f
00
(z) = −2
(z+1)3
which is defined and strictly negative
over all the domain.
Moreover the proposed function also "works" with strictly dominated strategies in the
sense that f(z)mmr assigns to a player a null belief about the event of his opponent playing
a strictly dominated strategy.
As explained in the previous section we cannot claim the minimax regret to be the
unique function that satisfies all the axioms and the additional requirements. It is however
an advantage that an already existing concept (though normally used for diﬀerent purposes)
may be used to approximate players’ beliefs. In this way in fact there is no need to invoke
new definitions or ad hoc formulas.
Moreover the following proposition underlines an appreciable feature of f(z)mmr, namely
that it is the unique one among all linear functions that obeys all the axioms and derived
properties. As before, the results are proven in the simplified context of Game 2 but, because
of Lemma 1, they also hold with more general payoﬀ structures.
Proposition 6 If f(z) = az+bcz+d ,∀z and f satisfies Lemma 1 =⇒ f(z) =
z
z+1 = f(z)mmr,∀z.
Proof. For f to satisfy Lemma 1 we must have f(0) = bd = 0 (which implies b = 0) and
f(1) = ac+d =
1
2 (which implies 2a = c + d). Now impose the condition f(z) + f(
1
z ) =
az
cz+d +
a
c+dz = 1 which is equivalent to (z
2+1)(ad− cd)+z(2ac− c2−d2) = 0,∀z. Consider
for instance the cases of z = 12 and z =
1
4 . If z =
1
2 then (a)
5
4(ad−cd)+
1
2(2ac−c
2−d2) = 0.
If z = 14 then (b)
17
16(ad − cd) +
1
4(2ac − c
2 − d2) = 0. Subtract (b) from (a) to get : (c)
1
4(2ac − c
2 − d2) = − 316(ad − cd). Substitute (c) in (b) :
17
16(ad − cd) −
3
16 (ad − cd) =
14
16(ad − cd) = 0 i.e. ad − cd = 0. This last condition is verified if: (1) d = 0, but given
that 2a = c+ d then we would have f(z) = 12 ,∀z which fails Lemma 1 because f would not
be strictly increasing. (2) a = c, but given that 2a = c + d we must have a = c = d. This
simplifies to our formulation: f(z) = az+bcz+d =
az
cz+d =
az
az+a =
z
z+1 = f(z)mmr.
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4 Other candidate concepts
In the previous section the mixed version of the minimax regret has been shown to obey all
the axioms and derived properties required for approximating players’ beliefs in a 2x2 game,
being at the same time very simple in its functional form.
In this section we check the compliance to the axioms of other existing concepts commonly
used in game theory and decision theory. Two categories are recognizable among these
candidates: the first one collects proposals that are connected with the concept of mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (subsections 4.1 and 4.2), the second one considers criteria which
mainly find application in decision theory, namely the maxmin (4.3) and the Laplace (4.4)
criteria. Subsection 4.5 considers the hypothesis that beliefs may be captured by a logit
specification. In line with what has been done for the minimax regret we keep on referring
to Game 2, considering how these candidate functions perform in approximating the beliefs
of player B on what A will play. The table that appears in section 4.6 summarizes the
results.
4.1 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of player A
According to this hypothesis playerB believes player A randomizes overHA and TA following
the probability distribution the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (msne) attaches to player
A. At first glance this may seem a good candidate given that mixed Nash equilibria, out
of many diﬀerent interpretations7, have also been considered as mimicking players’ beliefs.
However this proposal does not even pass the requirements of the first axiom. First there
is an issue of existence: in a 2x2 game a well defined msne exists only when there are no
strictly dominant strategies. Second, and more important, the msne of player A depends
by construction only on player B’s payoﬀs given that the mix adopted by A has to make
B indiﬀerent among his strategies. In other words, this criterion does not capture any own
payoﬀ eﬀect: no matter how the payoﬀs of player A could change, A’s distribution in the
mixed equilibrium (and thus B’s beliefs) remains the same as far as B’s payoﬀs remain fixed.
The msne of player A thus fails Axiom 1 and as a consequence, it also fails all the remaining
ones8.
7Cfr. section 3.2 in the book "A course on game theory" by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, MIT press).
8Moreover the predictive power of such a beliefs formulation would be very low. In fact any strategy in
the support of the mixed equilibrium of B would be a best response.
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4.2 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of player B
This alternative would imply that the probability distribution that the msne attaches to
player B could be considered as B’s beliefs about what A would play. The msne of player
B still suﬀers from the problem of nonexistence in the presence of dominant strategies but
it is indeed a function of the payoﬀs of player A. In order to assess the performance of this
proposal, we apply it to Game 2, which is reproduced below.
2)
(q) (1− q)
HB TB
f(z)→ HA z, · 0, · (pmm)
TA 0, · 1, · (1− pmm)
200)
(q) (1− q)
HB TB
f(z)→ HA 0, · 1, ·
TA z, · 0, ·
The probability distribution of themsne is defined by the q∗ that solves q∗z+(1− q∗) 0 =
q∗0 + (1− q∗) 1, i.e. q∗ = 11+z . Then the beliefs of player B about A playing HA should be
captured by:
f(z)msneB =
1
1 + z
This specification does not obey the monotonicity axiom since f(z)msneB is decreasing
in z, the opposite behavior with respect to the one prescribed by Axiom 5. To see how
misleading this interpretation could be, consider as an example the case in which z = 9. In
such a situation the msne of player B proposal would imply that player B believes A will
play HA with probability f(z) = 0.1, clearly a counter intuitive indication. Indeed letting
players best respond to these beliefs would lead to predictions which are often totally in
contrast with experimental results.
To solve this problem one may be tempted to approximate the beliefs of player B with
the complement to 1 of f(z)msneB . The functional form for the beliefs function would then
be: f(z) = 1− q∗, where again q∗ defines the probability distribution of the msne of player
B. If applied to Game 2, this proposal leads to the following functional form:
f(z)1−msneB =
z
1 + z
which indeed satisfies the monotonicity axiom. Actually this function identifies the same
beliefs indicated by the minimax regret9 and so, apparently, it should obey all the axioms.
9Gallice (2005) shows that in any 2x2 game where a well defined msne exists its probability distibution
is either the same or the mirror image of the minimax regret distribution of the other player.
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However it fails axioms 7 and 8. Consider for instance Game 200 above, a game in which
the payoﬀs of the two rows have been inverted with respect to Game 2. The probability
distribution of the mixed equilibrium of B is again defined by q∗ = 11+z . It follows that
player B’s beliefs on A playing HA would then be the same as before: f(z)1−msneB =
z
z+1 ,
a fact that violates Axiom 8 for ∀z 6= 1. A similar demonstration shows that this proposal
also fails Axiom 7.
4.3 Maxmin of player A
Are the strategies selected by the maxmin criterion a credible candidate for approximating
players’ beliefs? The pure version of the maxmin criterion predicts a player to choose the
strategy which guarantees him the highest minimum payoﬀ. As in the case of the minimax
regret, such a "pure" formulation does not obey the continuity and monotonicity axioms.
Allowing for mixed strategies the maxmin criterion assumes the player to mix over his
strategies in such a way to maximize the expected minimum. Referring to Game 2 this
would imply f(z)mm = pmm where pmm is such that pmmz = (1− pmm) and thus
f(z)mm =
1
1 + z
In the context of Game 2 this alternative leads to the same functional form which
characterized the msneB proposal. Therefore this specification does not satisfy Axiom 5
(monotonicity). More in general, in 2x2 games where all the payoﬀs are diﬀerent from 0,
the probability distributions implied by the maxmin criterion and by the msne are usually
diﬀerent. However they both continue to fail the monotonicity requirement.
4.4 Laplace
According to this possibility player B believes player A chooses the strategy to play following
the Laplace criterion. This criterion assumes a player to best respond to uniform priors.
The strategy to be chosen is then the one which has the highest sum of payoﬀs. In the case
of Game 2, this means:
f(z)La =



1 if z > 1
0 if z < 1
0.5 if z = 1
Clearly this criterion fails both the continuity and the strict monotonicity axioms.
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4.5 Logit rule
If the beliefs of player B about player A playing HA in Game 2 were approximated using a
logit rule, they would take the following analytical form:
f(z)lo =
ez
ez + e1
It is easy to see that this formulation fails Axiom 3 (dominance) given that f(0)lo 6= 0
as well as Axiom 6 (homogeneity of degree 0) given that e
kz
ekz+ek 6= e
z
ez+e1 .
4.6 A summary
Table 1 summarizes the compliance to the axioms of the candidate functions which have been
considered till now. The axioms are identified as: consistency with probability distribution
(1), symmetry (2), dominance (3), continuity (4), monotonicity (5), homogeneity of degree
zero (6), insensitivity to column switch (7) and sensitivity to row switch (8).
CriteriaÂAxioms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Minimax regret of pl. A y y y y y y y y
Msne of pl. A n n n n n n n n
Msne of pl. B y10 y n y n y n n
1-Msne of pl. B y11 y y y y y n n
Maxmin y y n y n y y y
Laplace y y y n n y y y
Logit y y n y y n y y
Table 1: compliance to the axioms of the candidate functions.
5 A procedure to forecast outcomes
The proposal that the minimax regret may approximate players’ beliefs has been until now
discussed in the simplified framework of Game 2. Still we claimed from the beginning that
results were also valid in more general cases. Here we apply our conjecture to a game
that encompasses the cases of a matching pennies game and of a game with a dominant
10The axiom is satisfied if there are no dominant strategies.
11As before.
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strategy. The example is meant to show how simple is the process to approximate beliefs,
understressing once more the inadequacy of proposals connected with the concept of mixed
strategy Nash equilibria. It also serves as a preliminary stage to introduce a simple procedure
for forecasting individuals’ strategies which are more likely to be observed when games are
played "for real". The predictions of this procedure will then be compared with existing
experimental evidences.
Consider the following game where k ∈ [−∞,∞).
4)
HB TB
HA k,−1 −1, 1
TA −1, 1 1,−1
R1
k∈(−1,∞)
=
HB TB
HA 0, 2 2, 0
TA k + 1, 0 0, 2
R2
k∈[−∞,−1)
=
HB TB
HA −1− k, 2 2, 0
TA 0, 0 0, 2
For k ∈ (−1,∞) Game 4 is a matching pennies game. With k = 1 the game is in its
standard version, with k 6= 1 the game is asymmetric. In both cases the regret matrix is given
by R1. The minimax regret mixed strategy for player A is given by: (p˜AHA + (1− p˜A)TA)
where p˜A = 1+k3+k is the probability that the mmr allocates to strategy HA and thus our
candidate to approximate B’s beliefs about A playing that strategy. The function for p˜A
appears as the bold concave curve in Figure 2 which focuses on the conjectured beliefs of
player B about what A will play12.
For k ∈ (−∞,−1] the game has a diﬀerent structure since strategy HA is dominated by
TA. The dominance is weak for k = −1 and strict otherwise. The regret matrix is given by
R2 and the minimax regret attaches probability 0 to A playing HA. In Figure 2 this appears
as the bold line that lies on the x-axis for k ≤ −1.
The other two functions (thin lines) that appear in Figure 2 depict, respectively, the
probability that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium assigns to player A playing strategy
HA
¡
1
2
¢
and to player B playing strategyHB
³
2
3+k
´
. The figure thus highlights the problems
which were mentioned in the previous section: the msne of player A does not respond to a
change in A’s payoﬀ (in this case k) while the msne of player B does respond to a change in
k but not in the desired direction. Note also that the functions for the minimax regret and
12For ∀k ∈ (−∞,∞) the minimax regret of player B is
?
1
2
HB + 12TB
?
. According to our interpretation
this implies that player A believes player B is equally likely to play any of his strategies no matter the
specific value of k.
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for the msne of the two players intersect just once. The intersection happens for the unique
k (in this case k = 1, symmetric game) for which all the three functions reach a value of 12 .
0
f
-8 -6 -4 -2 2 4 6 8 10k
Figure 2: beliefs approximation through minimax regret in a specific game.
In front of such a game, a way to test our theory would be to set a certain k, elicit players’
beliefs and check if these subjective beliefs lie close to the ones implied by the minimax regret.
We do not pursue this testing strategy for two reasons. First, we claim that the minimax
regret beliefs are a good approximation of the real ones from an "operational" point of
view, in the sense that they both lead to the same best response13. In fact there is no need
of extreme precision as far as the conjectured beliefs prove to be useful in forecasting the
behavior of the majority of individuals. Second, the technique of beliefs elicitation is still a
bit controversial in the literature. The risk is to get biased answers since agents, in declaring
their beliefs, are pushed to think more strategically than they would normally do. Croson
(2000) finds, for instance, significant diﬀerences in the experimental results of public good
and prisoner’s dilemma games played with and without belief elicitation. On the other side
Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Rey Biel (2004) do not observe diﬀerent behavior in the
context of normal form games.
Therefore, instead of testing the precision of the theory, we test its usefulness. Refer
again to Game 4. For any possible k the minimax regret function indicates a unique beliefs
distribution defined over the two strategies of the opponent. The expected payoﬀ of the
13This happens whenever the subjective beliefs and the conjectured ones of player i lie on the same side
of the unit interval with respect to the mixed equilibrium of player i0, which sets the indiﬀerence point.
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two pure strategies conditional on this distribution can then be easily computed. The
strategy characterized by the highest expected payoﬀ is the one which best responds to the
conjectured beliefs and thus the one we would expect individuals to play. This is the simple
structure of the procedure we now present. The testing strategy is equally simple: to check
if the hypothetical behavior which stems by the conjectured beliefs is consistent with the
one observed in experiments. The focus remains on matching pennies but the procedure,
which we now formally define, can (and will) also be applied to other classes of games.
We consider a 2 × 2 matching pennies game played between players A and B. Let
Si = {Hi, Ti} be the strategy space of player i = {A,B} and ui (si, si0) the payoﬀs of the
game. The unique minimax regret distribution is given by:
{(p˜AHA + (1− p˜A)TA) , (p˜BHB + (1− p˜B)TB)}
where p˜i defines the probability with which player i should play strategy Hi in order to
minimize his expected regret. With a slightly diﬀerent notation with respect to the previous
sections where only B’s beliefs were considered, define now as fi = [θ, 1− θ] the beliefs
player i holds on player i0 playing strategies Hi0 with probability θ and strategy Ti0 with
probability 1− θ. βi(fi) is the best reply function of player i. It uses i’s beliefs as an input
and provides as an output the strategy i must choose in order to maximize his expected
payoﬀ.
The procedure
1. Compute the minimax regret distribution for the two players and retrieve p˜A and p˜B .
2. Assign the following beliefs to the two players:
• fA = [p˜B , (1− p˜B)]
• fB = [p˜A, (1− p˜A)]
3. Let the two players choose the strategy to play according to βi(fi):
• βi(fi) =



{Hi} iﬀ ui(Hi|fi) > ui(Ti|fi)
{Ti} iﬀ ui(Hi|fi) < ui(Ti|fi)
{0.5Hi + 0.5Ti} iﬀ ui(Hi|fi) = ui(Ti|fi)
The strategies selected by βi(fi) are the ones which have the largest probability to be
played in a one shot game or, equivalently, the ones which we would expect to be chosen
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with the highest frequency if the game is played in a large enough population. Whenever
ui(Hi|fi) 6= ui(Ti|fi),∀i, every player has a single best response and the intersection of the
two selected strategies indicates a single outcome of the game as the most likely one. If
ui(Hi|fi) = ui(Ti|fi) for a unique i = {A,B} then two are the outcomes selected by the
procedure. Finally if ui(Hi|fi) = ui(Ti|fi),∀i, it means that both players are indiﬀerent on
what to play and therefore all the four outcomes are equally likely.
The procedure thus provides a forecast in three simple steps: it is enough to compute the
minimax regret, use its probability distributions to approximate players’ beliefs and choose
for each player the strategies (one or two) that best responds to these beliefs. Again we
do not claim this procedure to be consciously used by players. What we claim is that, on
average, the procedure is operationally valid i.e. the majority of individuals play the game
"as if" they were applying it.
6 Experimental evidences for matching pennies games
We apply the proposed procedure to matching pennies games for which experimental results
are available from other studies14. Given that the procedure aims to capture the behavior of
inexperienced players the ideal data to test our conjecture come from experiments in which
subjects played just once a single game (data are reported in Table 2, Section 6.1). Still, as
a matter of comparison, data about the first round of repeated games are also considered
provided that players were randomly matched in each round so that inter temporal eﬀects
are minimized (data appear in Table 3, Section 6.2). Also in this second case the procedure is
able to predict the strategies which are overplayed even though the robustness of the results
is lower. Despite of the games being diﬀerent, this last result suggests that individuals’
behavior is diﬀerent (though still similar) in front of one shot interactions and first round of
repeated games.
6.1 One shot games
The first three games in Table 2 (GH1, GH2 and GH3) and the correspondent experimental
results are taken from Goeree and Holt (2001). Each game was played only once by a
diﬀerent pool of 50 subjects. In the original paper the authors use these games to evaluate
the predictive power of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The last three games appear
in Goeree and Holt (2004) who took them from Guyer and Rapoport (1972). In the original
14With respect to the original papers strategies will be renamed in order to be consistent with previous
sections.
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experiment 214 subjects were asked to play in a random order 244 games belonging to
diﬀerent typologies. Note two things about these last three games: first, the payoﬀ structure
is more complex and second, despite of the fact that games were one shot, the huge number
of strategic situations that the players had to face makes the experiment less reliable for our
purposes.
The last four columns of Table 2 are the important ones: in the fourth to last column
we report βi(fi) = {·}, the prediction of the procedure. The third to last column presents
the experimental results in the form a/b Si, where a is the number of players that chose
strategy Si = {Hi, Ti} and b = 0.5N is the total number of row or column players.
The second to last column shows the hit rate which measures the performance of the
prediction in forecasting actual behavior. The hit rate is a simple summary statistics which
counts the number of hits, i.e. the proportion of player that chose the forecasted strategy.
It is described in Verbeek (2004) and used for instance in Gneezy and Guth (2003). The hit
rate ranges between 0% (all misses) and 100% (all hits) with 50% being the expected rate
of randomly guessing between the two strategies and thus the benchmark for evaluating the
value added of the procedure. So, when the procedure indicates a single strategy the hit
rate simply captures the percentage of players who actually played it. In games in which the
procedure indicates that subjects should uniformly randomize and b is odd (like in GH1),
the hit rate reaches 100% if the players split as equally as possible. In game GH1 for instance
the hit rate would have been 100% both if 12 or 13 out of the 25 row or column players
chose HA15.
Finally in the last column we test for the significance in the diﬀerence between the pro-
portions of actual plays observed in the experiments and the benchmark uniform distribution
of choices. Our claim is in fact to be able to ex-ante individuate the strategies which are over
played by agents. We use the Fisher’s exact probability test which calculates the probability
of the diﬀerence in the distribution between the observed data and the alternative uniform
data. When our procedure selects a single strategy we would expect the null hypothesis
(observed data being generated by a uniform distribution) to be rejected while when the
procedure indicates that players should uniformly mix then we would expect the null hy-
pothesis not to be rejected. The last column reports the (one sided) p-values in percentage:
values below the critical value of 5% indicate that the observed proportions are unlikely to
come from a uniform distribution, values above 5% are such that the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected. For clarity purposes, p-values that are in lines with our procedure are preceded
by an asterisk.
15A more precise formulation of the hit rate, which has to be used in more complex cases, but that
encompasses the ones just described, is presented in the next subsection.
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Game Notes Procedure Exper. Hit Fisher
N selects results rate p-values
HB TB
GH1 HA 80, 40 40, 80 1 shot 12HA+
1
2TA 12/25 HA 100% *22%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 12HB+
1
2TB 12/25 HB 100% *22%
GH2 HA 320, 40 40, 80 / / HA 24/25 HA 96% *0,04%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 TB 21/25 TB 84% *1,6%
GH3 HA 44, 40 40, 80 / / TA 23/25 TA 92% *0,2%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 HB 20/25 HB 80% *3,6%
GR4 HA 24, 5 5,−10 1 shot HA 91/107 HA 85% *0%
214 TA 26, 9 −10, 26 244 g. HB 85/107 HB 79% *0%
GR5 HA 15, 5 5,−10 / / HA 82/107 HA 77% *0%
214 TA 26, 9 −10, 26 HB 81/107 HB 76% *0%
GR6 HA 9, 5 5,−10 / / 12HA+
1
2TA 74/107 HA 62% 0,4%
214 TA 26, 9 −10, 26 TB 32/107 TB 30% 0,2%
Table 2: the hit rate of the procedure in one shot matching pennies games.
To have a better feeling of how the procedure works in practice consider a couple of
examples. Game GH1 is a standard or symmetric matching pennies game. The minimax
regret is obviously 12Hi +
1
2Ti,∀i = {A,B} and thus the procedure assigns uniform beliefs
to both players. Indeed, in front of such a game, no player has any reason to expect his
opponent to be biased in playing a specific strategy. Both strategies therefore lead to the
same expected payoﬀ and the procedure predicts all outcomes to be equally likely. Actual
frequencies confirm that the distributions of choices of the two populations of players are as
uniform as possible.
Things are diﬀerent when the game is asymmetric like for instance in game GH2 where
the payoﬀ for players A in the outcome (HA,HB) has been modified. In these cases the
minimax regret distribution remains the same for players B
¡
1
2HB +
1
2TB
¢
but it changes
for players A
¡
7
8HA +
1
8TA
¢
. It follows that, according to our conjecture, a generic player
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A still has uniform beliefs about B while B’s beliefs change. The procedure then selects
strategy HA as the most likely choice for players A. This strategy has an expected value of
1
2 (320) +
1
2 (40) = 180 which is larger than the expected value of TA :
1
2 (40) +
1
2 (80) = 60.
Strategy HA was in eﬀect chosen by 24 out of the 25 A players. The mechanism is the same
for players B: according to the conjecture they strongly believe (probability of 78 ) that their
opponents will play HA. The procedure thus selects TB as B’s most likely strategy given
that 78 (80) +
1
8 (40) = 75 > 45 =
7
8 (40) +
1
8 (80). Strategy TB was indeed chosen by 84% of
B players.
The prediction of the procedure is confirmed also in Game GH3 where strategies TA
and HB are the selected ones and the hit rate is again considerably high. The hit rate
remains above 75% and the p-values are in line with our conjecture also in games GR4 and
GR5 while results are less good in the case of Game GR6 in which the procedure failed
to predict that players over played strategies HA and HB. Again we stress that the last
three games use data collected more than thirty years ago (1972), that they have a more
complex structure involving also a substantially negative payoﬀ and that the design of the
experiment does not exactly fit our ideal framework of a single non repeated interaction.
Nevertheless the overall hit rate is above 50% in 11 out of the 12 predictions, being above
70% in 10 out of 12 cases. Considering just games where the procedure indicates a single
outcome (GH2, GH3,GR4, GR5), the procedure correctly predicts the choices of 81% of the
players. Note that in these cases the outcome selected is clearly not an equilibrium since a
generic player A would always like to deviate. It may then seem that somehow players A act
with a lower degree of rationality in comparison with players B16 . However the behavior of
the majority of both classes of players is consistent with the archetype of individuals that
play as if they were best responding to the conjectured minimax beliefs.
6.1.1 A comparison with Nash equilibrium and maxmin prediction
We briefly compare the performance of the prediction of our procedure with the ones pro-
vided by the mixed Nash equilibrium and by the maxmin criterion. For brevity we just
consider the first three simpler games (Goeree and Holt, 2001).
For what concerns the Nash equilibrium, the authors present the results for Game GH1
as supportive of the msne prediction, while they show the results of games GH2 and GH3
as evidences of its failure: in fact, given that player B’s payoﬀs do not change, the msne
predicts player A to keep on uniformly mixing in all the three games, a forecast which is
clearly denied by the data. Therefore the authors write that "The Nash analysis seems to
16This obviously cannot be the case given the large number of subjects and the random allocation of
players to roles.
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work only by coincidence, when the payoﬀ structure is symmetric and deviation risks are
balanced”17.
Analyzing the same results through the lens of our conjecture, it seems indeed that the
fact that the Nash analysis works in game GH1 may be the result of a coincidence. But
this coincidence has an explanation. In symmetric matching pennies games the probability
distributions implied by the msne and by the minimax regret always coincide. In fact the
situation of Game GH1 is analogous to the game depicted in Figure 2 with k = 1, the unique
point for which the functions for the minimax regret and for the msne intersect.
Still individuals’ behavior is by far better captured by our behavioral model rather than
by the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium prediction. In fact in games GH2 and GH3 the
Nash mixed equilibrium is extremely good in capturing players B’s proportions but, because
of the already mentioned "no own payoﬀ eﬀect", it totally fails in predicting that players A
will over play strategy HA. To have a feeling for this diﬀerence, Table 3 computes the hit
rate of the Nash prediction for the first three games18. The table also computes the hit rate
of the maxmin prediction: as in the case of the msne, maxmin works fine in the symmetric
game GH1 but its prediction is completely misleading in games GH2 and GH3. Asterisks
next to the hit rate indicate that the associated p-values do not reject the hypothesis of the
prediction being able to selct the strategies which are overplayed.
Game Exper. Nash eq. Hit Maxmin Hit
N results prediction rate19 prediction rate
HB TB
GH1 HA 80, 40 40, 80 12/25 HA 12HA+
1
2TA *100%
1
2HA+
1
2TA *100%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 12/25 HB 12HB+
1
2TB *100%
1
2HB+
1
2TB *100%
GH2 HA 320, 40 40, 80 24/25 HA 12HA+
1
2TA 8%
1
8HA+
7
8TA 5%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 21/25 TB 18HB+
7
8TB *86%
1
2HB+
1
2TB 32%
GH3 HA 44, 40 40, 80 23/25 TA 12HA+
1
2TA 16%
10
11HA+
1
11TA 9%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 20/25 HB 1011HB+
1
11TB *88%
1
2HB+
1
2TB 40%
Table 3: the hit rate of the Nash and maxmin prediction in the GH matching pennies games.
17Goeree, J. & Holt, C. (2001), “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions”,
American Economic Review, Vol. 91, pp. 1419.
18Results are similar also for the three GR games where the Nash equilibrium indicates that players should
randomize according to 17
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Hi+ 1532Ti, i.e. an almost uniform distribution.
19Given that msne and maxmin often indicate non uniform mixed strategies, the hit rate has been com-
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6.2 First round of games with random matching
A similar behavior as the one found in the case of one shot games characterizes also in-
dividuals’ play in the first round of repeated games. We restrict our attention to games
in which players were randomly matched each round to minimize inter temporal strategic
eﬀects. Table 3 reports data about matching pennies games played in this way. The first
game has been studied by Nyarko and Schotter (2002). It has been played for 60 rounds
and over four treatments to investigate the issue of beliefs learning. Game NSa reports the
data of treatment 4 (random matching and no belief elicitation) which, in the original paper,
served as a control treatment. Game NSb is equal to the previous one but the number of
players is larger because data from treatment 4 and treatment 1 (random matching and
belief elicitation) are pooled together. The last four games (MPW ) have been studied by
McKelvey, Palfrey and Weber (2000)20. In the original paper these games were played 50
times and data were used to test a version of the quantal response equilibrium that allows
for heterogeneity among subjects.
Table 4 has the same structure of Table 2 and it summarizes the results. Again asterisks
in the last column indicate that the p-values are in line with the predictions of the procedure.
GameNS is a constant sum game. Minimax regret distribution are given by
¡
3
5HA +
2
5TA
¢
and
¡
2
5HB +
3
5TB
¢
. The expected value of strategy HA is then 25 (6) +
3
5 (3) =
21
5 which
is equal to the expected value of TA: 25 (3) +
3
5 (5) =
21
5 so that players A are indiﬀerent
on what to play. The procedure instead indicates that players B will select strategy TB
and it thus forecasts outcomes (HA, TB) and (TA, TB) as the most likely ones. The hit rate
is particularly high when only the data about the treatment without beliefs elicitation are
considered but it still remains above 75% when the data coming from the belief elicitation
treatment are also considered. The p-values always indicate that the data for players A are
not unlikely to come from a uniform distribution of play while they confirm that players B
overplay strategy TB.
The last four games all have a similar structure with the payoﬀ for players A in the
outcome {HA,HB} being the largest one. The hit rate never goes below 50% even though
its value is lower than before. In some cases, also because of small samples, the p-values do
not allow us to make precise statements about the robustness of these results. Finally note
puted according to the formula: H =
?
1− |a−p|
max{b−p,p}
?
·100. As before, a is the number of player that played
strategy Si = {Hi, Ti}, b = 0.5N is the number of total players in that role and p is the number of players
that should have played strategy Si according to the (msne or maxmin) prediction. Loosely speaking the
hit rate assigns a penalization (numerator) which increases in the distance between the predicted and the
actual outcomes. This penalization is then scaled (denumerator) such that a hit rate of 0% is assigned to
the case in which the distance is maximal. This formulation encompasses the simpler cases of the previous
section so that the hit rates of tables 2 and 3 are directly comparable.
20 I thank Roberto Weber for giving me access to the original data set.
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that the procedure seems to work better in anticipating the behavior of B players (with an
overall hit rate of 77% in all the MPW games, p-value of 0%) than the one of A players
(hit rate of 55%, p-value of 8%).
Game notes Procedure Exper. Hit Fisher
n selects results rate p-values
HB TB
NSa HA 6, 2 3, 5 1st round 12HA+
1
2TA 8/15 HA 100% *28%
30 TA 3, 5 5, 3 random m. TB 13/15 TB 87% *3%
NSb HA 6, 2 3, 5 1st round 12HA+
1
2TA 11/29 HA 76% *13,5%
58 TA 3, 5 5, 3 r.m.+bel.el. TB 23/29 TB 79% *1,4%
MPWa HA 9, 0 0, 1 1st round HA 20/36 HA 55% 16,7%
72 TA 0, 1 1, 0 random m. TB 29/36 HB 80% *0,05%
MPWb HA 9, 0 0, 4 / / HA 14/24 HA 58% 19,3%
48 TA 0, 4 1, 0 TB 21/24 HB 88% *0,5%
MPWc HA 36, 0 0, 4 / / HA 13/24 HA 54% 21,8%
48 TA 0, 4 4, 0 TB 17/24 HB 71% 8%
MPWd HA 4, 0 0, 1 / / HA 6/12 HA 50% 31,6%
24 TA 0, 1 1, 0 TB 8/12 TB 75% 23,3%
Table 4: the procedure in first round of repeated matching pennies games with random matching.
7 The procedure in other games
The same procedure which until now has been applied only to matching pennies can also be
used with other games. In fact the procedure provides predictions for all 2x2 games. In some
of them it is probably not needed given that it is trivial to forecast the strategies the players
adopt. Still it is good to know that the procedure selects a meaningful outcome, i.e. an
outcome which has some theorethical foundations and which is confirmed by experimental
27
evidences. In this respect the content of this section can be seen as a robustness check of
our conjecture.
In any 2x2 game the steps to select the strategies more likely to be chosen by inexperi-
enced players remain the same: compute the minimax regret, use its probability distribution
to approximate players’ beliefs and choose the pure strategies that best respond to these be-
liefs. Simple examples of a game with a single dominant strategy (SD), prisoner’s dilemma
(PD), pure coordination games (PC), stag-hunt games (SH) and symmetric (BS) and
asymmetric (aBS) battle of the sexes games are shown in Table 5. The claim about the
eﬀectiveness of the prediction still refers to one shot interactions.
Game Minimax Procedure Related Notes
regret selects outcome
HB TB
SD HA 3, 1 1, 0 1HA+0TA {HA} {HA,HB} Unique
TA 1, 0 0, 2 13HB+
2
3TB {HB} NE
PD HA 3, 3 0, 5 0HA+1TA {TA} {TA, TB} Unique
5, 0 1, 1 0HB+1TB {TB} NE
PC HA 2, 2 0, 0 13HA+
2
3TA {TA} {TA, TB} Pareto dominant
TA 0, 0 4, 4 13HB+
2
3TB {TB} NE
SH HA 2, 2 3, 0 23HA+
1
3TA {HA} {HA,HB} Risk dominant
TA 0, 3 4, 4 23HB+
1
3TB {HB} NE
BS HA 3, 1 0, 0 34HA+
1
4TA {HA, TA} {·, ·} All outcomes
TA 0, 0 1, 3 14HB+
3
4TB {HB, TB} equally likely
aBS HA 5, 1 0, 0 56HA+
1
6TA {HA} {HA,HB} Payoﬀ dominant
TA 0, 0 1, 3 14HB+
3
4TB {HB} NE
Table 5: the procedure applied to other classes of 2x2 games.
In games that have at least a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies, if the procedure
selects a single outcome, then this outcome is always a NE of the game (SD,PD,PC,SH, aBS).
However it may be the case that the procedure does not select any outcome (or better it
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selects them all), even if pure Nash equilibria exist. This is what happens in the case of
symmetric battle of the sexes (BS): in fact the expected payoﬀs of the two strategies con-
ditional on the conjectured beliefs are equal. Indeed, because of the tension between the
preferences of the two players, data coming from the laboratory confirm quite a dispersed
distribution of choices. The situation is diﬀerent in the asymmetric version of the game
(aBS) where, in accordance with experimental evidences, the procedure selects the payoﬀ
dominant equilibrium. The reason is that a generic player B correctly believes that his
opponent has stronger incentives in playing his preferred strategy.
The conjectured beliefs of the players sometimes happen to be incorrect in the sense
that they are not in line with the strategies selected by the procedure (SD,BS, aBS). For
instance in the SD game the row player expects his opponent to be biased toward playing
strategy TB but indeed player B plays strategyHB . We do not perceive this to be a problem.
In fact we axiomatized the beliefs of inexperienced, unsophisticated and boundedly rational
players and therefore the possibility that in some cases the procedure allocates to players
"incorrect" beliefs was embedded in our model since the beginning. What matters is that
the players play according to their beliefs and that the prediction of the procedure is in
line with existing evidences. In the case of the SD game for instance, player A chooses his
strictly dominant strategy (which is a best response to any possible belief) and player B
best responds choosing HB
It is also interesting to note how the procedure performs in the case of coordination
games. In accordance with theory, intuition and experimental results the Pareto dominant
NE is the outcome selected in pure coordination games (PC). More controversial is the
indication in stag hunt games (SH) where players face a trade oﬀ between an unsafe, but
potentially more rewarding, strategy and a safer one. Such games have therefore two Nash
equilibria in pure strategies: a Pareto dominant one (more rewarding) and a risk dominant
one (less risky). The latter is the one indicated by the procedure. For this class of games
the experimental evidence is mixed (see for instance Harsanyi and Selten, 1988; Straub,
1995; Haruvy and Stahl, 2004) but there is a prevailing consensus indicating indeed the
risk dominant equilibrium. With this respect and because of its capacity to select a single
outcome, the suggested procedure can also be considered as a tool for equilibrium selection
in games with multiple equilibria.
8 Conclusion
2x2 one shot games remain a fundamental tool for modeling strategic interactions. These
games capture the simplest relations (the number of players and strategies is minimal) but
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still they can be used to describe an uncountable number of situations. In fact many real
life interactions take place among two subjects and many decisions are binary in nature.
No wonder therefore that the study of 2x2 games has always attracted a lot of attention.
Theory provides elegant tools to individuate the equilibria of these games; these equilibria
have often been given not only a normative interpretation (about how fully rational players
should play) but also a positive one (about how, less rational, real players are indeed expected
to play). The empirical relevance of these predictions may be weak, particularly for games
in which players’ interests are always in contrast (matching pennies). As a consequence to
predict players’ behavior in one oﬀ interactions remains a problematic issue.
This paper introduced a simple procedure to be used for forecasting the outcome of 2x2
one shot games. Using an axiomatic approach, we justified the use of minimax regret to
approximate the beliefs of inexperienced individuals. Then we let players behave as if they
were responding to these conjectured beliefs.
A nice feature of the procedure is that, in selecting the strategies more likely to be played,
it considers all the payoﬀs of the game. In fact the beliefs of generic player i are mimicked by
the minimax regret probability distribution of the opponent i0 and thus they depend on the
payoﬀs of the latter. But then, in computing best responses, also the payoﬀs of player i are
taken into account. Traditional concepts like the Nash equilibrium and maxmin strategies
do not display this "all payoﬀ" eﬀect being functions of only half of the payoﬀs of the game.
Indeed, when compared with existing experimental evidences about one shot matching
pennies games, our suggested procedure proved to be an eﬀective tool in anticipating the
moves of the vast majority of the players. Far from having fully solved the problem (for
instance the performance of the procedure seems to be much lower in games with more
than two strategies), we think that this paper may contribute to the study of individuals’
behavior in one shot games.
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